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Abstract
This paper introduces a new theory explaining entry and exit rates. According to our
model emphasizing the carrying capacity of a market, net entry is a reaction to a
disequilibrium situation. This is a situation in which the number of firms in the market is
unequal to the carrying capacity of that market. We derive an expression for the carrying
capacity and also some testable implications. We investigate the speed of adjustment
towards equilibrium, the effect of changes in consumer demand on the carrying capacity
and the relative importance of entry and exit in the adjustment process. The theoretical
model is tested using a panel data set of 22 retail industries for the 1981–1988 period.
 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The process of entry and exit of firms serves as an important source of structural
change in industries. Industries with low birth and death rates are alleged to be
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vulnerable to misallocation of resources, limited innovativeness, and formal or
tacit collusion (Geroski and Jacquemin, 1985). The continuous flows of entry and
exit represent a changing pool of potentially strong competitors, viz. the seedbed
of new activities from which will emerge the successful businesses and industries
of the future (Beesley and Hamilton, 1984).
Entry and exit rates vary strongly across industries (Dunne et al., 1988).
Empirical studies have proposed and examined a large number of factors which
explain these differences. These factors pertain to four broad categories. The first
category is the industry’s environment and comprises the basic exogenous demand
and cost conditions. Some of these environmental characteristics may restrict entry
and exit rates during the entire lifespan of the industry. Examples are extent of
consumer loyalty, laws affecting start-ups and possession of strategic raw
materials. The second category is the stage of the industry life cycle. Industries are
often subject to large waves of entry in the early stage of their life cycles followed
by a ‘‘shake-out’’ period in which many young inefficient firms exit while almost
no firms enter (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper and Graddy, 1990). Over the life
span of an industry the average growth rate of demand usually declines while the
number and height of entry barriers rises. Some of these barriers which become
more important at each subsequent stage of the industry life cycle are cost
advantages of incumbents, capital requirements and advertising intensity
(Karakaya and Stahl, 1989). The third category is the strategic behaviour of
incumbents. Incumbent firms may limit price or install excess capacity in order to
forestall or regulate entry. Highly concentrated industries could, as a result, exhibit
lower entry rates than comparable industries with a low degree of concentration
(Bunch and Smiley, 1992; Masson and Shaanan, 1986). The last factor is the
business cycle. During periods of a temporarily higher growth rate of demand
entrants are attracted by increases in profitability due to the inability of incumbents
to expand their capacity fast enough (Hause and Du Rietz, 1984). Entry and exit
are interrelated in that they are both affected by the factors mentioned above. Entry
and exit may however also be causally related: exit may cause entry and entry may
cause exit. Entering firms may replace or displace exiting firms (Carree and
Thurik, 1996; Love, 1996; Rosenbaum and Lamort, 1992).
Most empirical studies, with some exceptions such as Kessides (1986), (1990)
and Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), do not derive testable implications of a
theoretical model of industrial structure but instead use an ad-hoc specification for
the rates of entry and exit. As a consequence, much of the ‘‘knowledge’’ about the
processes of entry and exit is scattered (Schmalensee, 1989, p. 997). In this study
we propose a different approach. Each industry is assumed to consist of a number
of separate and relatively homogeneous markets for each of which a free-entry
equilibrium number of firms exists. We then model entry and exit at the separate
market level as adjustments to a disequilibrium situation. The number of firms in
the market is said to have attained the equilibrium value when all entrepreneurs
earn some critical level of profits. This equilibrium number of firms is called the
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carrying capacity. This term was first used in population ecology work (Hannan
and Freeman, 1977). It refers to the numbers of an organizational form that can be
sustained in a particular environment in isolation from other populations (Hannan
and Carroll, 1992, p. 29). When the actual number of firms in a market is larger
than the carrying capacity, there is need for exit in the current or a subsequent
period. However, if the actual number of firms is smaller than the carrying
capacity this implies room for entry. The carrying capacity depends on the amount
of consumer demand. In the case of a growing demand the carrying capacity will
increase as well.
In this study we derive an expression for the carrying capacity which we apply
to retail industries (shoptypes). These industries consist of many local markets with
only a handful of establishments. The retail markets can usually be characterized
by a high degree of product homogeneity, entrepreneurs facing similar cost
functions and demand conditions, and low entry and exit barriers. These elements
of market structure allow us to make some strong assumptions which facilitate the
derivation of an equilibrium number of independent firms in a market. Our model
may therefore be particularly applicable to traditional retailing where innovation
does not play an important role. An error correction model is used to estimate the
effect of changes in consumer demand on the carrying capacity, the speed of
adjustment of the actual number of firms to the carrying capacity and the relative
importance of entry and exit in the adjustment process. For this a panel data set at
a low level of aggregation for the retail sector is used. This study is one of the very
few to investigate the determinants of the selection process of entry and exit over
time in a non-manufacturing industry.
The plan of this study is as follows. In Section 2 an expression for the carrying
capacity of a market with oligopolistic competition is derived. Section 3 models
the adjustment process towards the equilibrium number of firms. In Section 4 the
data are presented and some characteristics of the retail sector are discussed. In
Section 5 two implications of the model are tested for Dutch retailing. The
empirical results for the error correction model are presented in Section 6, and
Section 7 presents the summary and discussion.
2. The carrying capacity
In this section the carrying capacity of a market with oligopolistic competition is
derived. This carrying capacity will be used as a benchmark for the actual number
of firms. The derivation of the carrying capacity is analogous to that of the
equilibrium number of firms in the homogeneous good exogenous sunk costs case
discussed by Sutton (1991) (pp. 30–32). Consider a market with N firms
producing an homogeneous good. Each of these firms is supposed to choose
output, q, and to have identical cost functions, C(q), and conjectural variations, f.
Firm j maximizes its profit, p 5 pq 2 C(q ), as follows:j j j
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≠p qQ ≠p ≠Q ≠Cj j
] ]]]] ]5 p 1 1 2 5 0, j 5 1, . . . ,N, (1)S D≠q p ≠Q Q ≠q ≠qj j j
Nwhere Q 5 o q is total market output and p is the market price. The termj51 j
≠Q /≠q is equal to the change in total market output resulting from a change in thej
output of firm j. It can be rewritten as
≠q≠Q k
] ]5 1 1O 5 1 1 f , j 5 1, . . . ,N, (2)j≠q ≠qj jk±j
where f are the conjectural variations. They are assumed identical across firmsj
and equal to f. Note that f is zero for a Cournot oligopoly. Introducing
e 5 (≠Q /≠p)( p /Q) as price elasticity of demand we have from (1) that
q1 1 f ≠Cj
]]] ]p 1 1 5 , j 5 1, . . . ,N. (3)S De Q ≠qj
Because marginal costs are equal for each firm, the production levels are also
equal: q 5 Q /N. Taking a linear cost function, C(q) 5 a 1 bq, the followingj
market price can be derived:
211 1 f
]]S Dp 5 b 1 1 . (4)Ne
We shall return to the justification of linearity of the cost function when discussing
the application of the model to the retail sector. The price elasticity of demand e is
usually assumed to be below zero. This implies that Ne , 2 1 2 f and f . 2 1
in order to have prices higher than marginal costs. Profits for each firm, p, can be
expressed as follows:
bQe bQ
]]]] ]p 5 2 a 2 . (5)Ne 1 1 1 f N
The demand elasticity of profit, h , and the number of firms elasticity of profit, h ,Q N
can now be determined:
≠p Q bQ(1 1 f)
]] ]]]]]]]]]h 5 5 (6)Q ≠Q p bQ(1 1 f) 1 aN(Ne 1 1 1 f)
and
≠p N 2 bQ(1 1 f)(2Ne 1 1 1 f)
]] ]]]]]]]]]]]]]h 5 5N 2≠N p bQ(1 1 f)(Ne 1 1 1 f) 1 aN(Ne 1 1 1 f)
2Ne 1 1 1 f
]]]]5 2h . (7)Q Ne 1 1 1 f
Note that h must be more than twice h in absolute terms because Ne , 2 1 2 f.N Q
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The question now is how many firms can this market carry. Assume that there is
*an exogenously given critical profit level, p . This level is determined by
1alternative opportunities for the owners of the firm to receive income. The
*carrying capacity is that number of firms at which this ‘‘reservation wage’’, p , is
equal to the firms’ profit, p, in the industry. Solving for N in Eq. (5), one finds
2that
]]]]]]]]]]1 2]* *N 5 2 1 2 f 2 (1 1 f) 2 4bQe(1 1 f) /(p 1 a) . (8)s dœ2e
*The carrying capacity, N , enlarges when total market demand, Q, increases,
*while it shrinks when the critical level of profits, p , increases. The carrying
capacity is lower in markets with high fixed costs, a, and low variable costs, b,
when compared to markets with low fixed and high variable costs. Low price
elasticity of demand, e, and high conjectural variation, f, lead to a less
competitive environment and therefore to a higher carrying capacity. The market is
said to be in a state of equilibrium when the actual number of firms is equal to the
carrying capacity. This is a free-entry equilibrium in which each entrepreneur
earns the same critical level of profits.
The demand elasticity of the carrying capacity, n , is derived as follows:Q
*≠N Q 1 1 1 f
]]] ] ]]]]]]]]]]]n 5 5 2Q 2*≠Q N 2 *2 (1 1 f) 2 4bQe(1 1 f) /(p 1 a)œ
*N e 1 1 1 f
]]]]5 . (9)*2N e 1 1 1 f
An important implication of Eq. (9) is that n must be less than 0.5 becauseQ
3*N e , 2 1 2 f. From Eqs. (7) and (9) it is easy to derive that n 5 2h /h inQ Q N
the equilibrium situation. It can also be derived that in this situation Eq. (6)
* *simplifies to h 5 (p 1 a) /p .Q
1 De Wit and Van der Winden (1990) find that the probability of becoming self-employed is higher,
the greater the difference between profit in the case of self-employment and wage in the case of
employment.
2 Note that conjectural variations are not constrained to be ‘‘consistent’’ (see, e.g., Kamien and
Schwartz, 1983).
3 Schmalensee (1992) (p. 126) also derives a free-entry equilibrium number of firms. His expression
also implies that a doubling of market demand less than doubles the equilibrium number of firms.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) estimate the size of the market needed to support two automobile dealers
to be larger than two times the size of the market needed to support a monopoly dealer. From Eq. (9)
one would expect this size to be at least three times the size of the market needed to support a
monopolist.
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3. Entry, exit and disequilibrium
The net entry of firms is assumed to be a reaction to a state of disequilibrium.
This reasoning is in line with the Kirznerian notion of entrepreneurial activity
originating from the existence of disequilibria characterized by the existence of
profit opportunities (Ikeda, 1990; Kirzner, 1973, 1979). We define disequilibrium
as the discrepancy between the carrying capacity in a market in a certain period
and the actual number of firms in that market. This notion of disequilibrium is
strongly connected to the existence of profit opportunities. One derives from Eqs.
(5) and (8) using Taylor expansion that
* *p 2 p N 2 N1i i i i
]]] ]]]]¯ 2 , (10)* *p n Ni Q i
*when evaluated in N 5 N where i is the market index. Eq. (10) shows thei i
relation between two discrepancies: that between the carrying capacity and the
actual number of firms in a market on the one hand and that between the
exogenously given critical level of profits and the actual level of profits in a
market on the other. Entrepreneurs are inclined not to accept a disequilibrium
situation expected to arise in period t because of the profit opportunities involved,
but are hampered by costs of entering (or exiting) immediately in period t. These
costs are assumed to rise quadratically because of congestion when many
entrepreneurs want to enter or exit a market. That is, entrepreneurs minimize the
following loss function (see Gilbert, 1986, for similar analyses):
2 2*L 5 l (E (ln(N )) 2 ln(N )) 1 l (Dln(N )) , l ,l . 0, (11)it 1 t21 it it 2 it 1 2
where E is the expectancy operator using information up until period t 2 1.t21
Minimizing Eq. (11) with respect to N yieldsit
l1
]] *Dln(N ) 5 (E (ln(N )) 2 ln(N )). (12)it t21 it i,t21l 1 l1 2
We make the following assumption about the expected carrying capacity. Denote
the growth rate of the carrying capacity from period t 2 1 to period t by g . Itit
* * *follows that ln(N ) 5 ln((1 1 g )N ) ¯ g 1 ln(N ) using that ln(1 1 x) ¯ xit it i,t21 it i,t21
when x is small. Defining g 5 l /(l 1 l ) we now obtain Eq. (13):1 1 2
*Dln(N ) 5 g(ln(N ) 2 ln(N ) 1 E g ), g . 0. (13)it i,t21 i,t21 t21 it
From this equation it is clear that net entry serves as an adjustment mechanism to a
disequilibrium situation. The adjustment process towards the carrying capacity in
the present study corresponds to that used in population ecology work (see Hannan
and Freeman, p. 941).
We assume that entrepreneurs have adaptive expectations about the growth rate
of the carrying capacity: E g 5 d 1 d g . That is, the expected growth ratet21 it 0i 1 i,t21
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of the carrying capacity is assumed to be determined by a shoptype-specific
element and the growth rate in the current period. In Appendix A we discuss four
alternatives for determining the value of d . We have no a priori beliefs about the1
value of d in the case of retailing unless that it is unlikely to lie below zero or to1
be in excess of unity. As a consequence, we have to rely on the criteria of
empirical fit or parsimony. It is shown in Appendix A that the data cannot
discriminate between any two values of d which lie in the unit interval [0,1]. For1
reasons of parsimony we choose d equal to zero, i.e. the expected growth of the1
carrying capacity is assumed not to depend on its current growth. Appendix A
presents empirical results for each of the four alternatives to determine the value of
d . By taking the first difference of Eq. (13) we derive Eq. (14) as follows:1
DDln(N ) 5 g( g 2 Dln(N )). (14)it i,t21 i,t21
We assume the growth rate of the carrying capacity to be determined completely
4by changes in consumer demand:
DQit
]]g 5 n . (15)it Q Qi,t21
Considering that ln(1 1 x) ¯ x when x is small and adding a disturbance term
assumed to be independently and identically distributed over the markets and over
the years, we have the following relation to be estimated:
DQ DNDN i,t21 i,t21it
]] ]]] ]]D 5 g n 2 1 e . (16)S DQ itN Q Ni,t21 i,t22 i,t22
That is, the change in the net entry rate, DN /N , is equal to the adjustmentit i,t21
rate, g, times the development over time of the level of disequilibrium plus a
disturbance term.
The change in the net entry rate is the result of a change in the gross entry rate
and a change in the gross exit rate. Gross entry and exit rates show substantial and
persistent differences across industries (see, e.g., Dunne et al., 1988). Especially in
the retail sector, gross entry and exit rates are very stable over the years. This is a
consequence of little change over time in the relative ease of entry and exit and of
4 In this study we concentrate on the effect of market demand on the carrying capacity. That is, we
assume for simplicity that the price elasticity of demand, e, the conjectural variation, f, the parameters
*of the cost function, a and b, and the exogenously given critical level of profits, p , are constant. In
retailing it is likely that the price elasticity of demand depends upon the average (regional) household
income, that the critical level of profits depends upon average (regional) wages and that the parameters
of the cost function depend upon average (regional) labour costs. From the beginning (1980) to the end
(1988) of the period of investigation the general real wage index and the real wage index in retailing in
the Netherlands declined just a few percent.
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5a continuously large pool of potential entrants for an industry. Each year a fairly
constant flow of entrepreneurs would like to enter or to exit (retail) industries. This
is partly caused by entrepreneurs retiring and being replaced by younger
entrepreneurs. We assume that deviating from the stable gross entry and exit rate
levels comes at a cost. This allows us to investigate the relative importance of
entry and exit in the adjustment process. We extend the loss function L byit
considering loss occurring from the gross entry rate (ent ) and the gross exit rateit
(ext ) to be different from an industry-specific constant, denoted by d and d ,it 1i 2i
respectively:
2 2*L 5 l (E (ln(N )) 2 ln(N ) 2 ent 1 ext ) 1 l (ent 2 ext )it 1 t21 it i,t21 it it 2 it it
2 2
1 l (ent 2 d ) 1 l (ext 2 d ) , l ,l ,l ,l . 0. (17)3 it 1i 4 it 2i 1 2 3 4
Note that ent 2 ext 5 DN /N ¯ Dln(N ). When l ± l , entry and exit differit it it i,t21 it 3 4
in their sensitivity to a state of disequilibrium and, hence, in their relative
importance in the adjustment process to a state of equilibrium. Solving for entit
and ext from the first-order conditions givesit
entit
*l (l 1 l 1 l )d 1 l (l 1 l )d 1 l l (E (ln(N ) 2 ln(N ))3 1 2 4 1i 4 1 2 2i 1 4 t21 it i,t21
]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]5 ,
(l 1 l )(l 1 l ) 1 l l1 2 3 4 3 4
(18)
extit
*l (l 1 l )d 1 l (l 1 l 1 l )d 2 l l (E (ln(N ) 2 ln(N ))3 1 2 1i 4 1 2 3 2i 1 3 t21 it i,t21
]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]5 .
(l 1 l )(l 1 l ) 1 l l1 2 3 4 3 4
(19)
Using (14), taking the first difference and adding disturbance terms, we have the
following two equations to be estimated:
DQ DNi,t21 i,t21
]]] ]]Dent 5 g n 2 1 e , (20)S Dit E Q EitQ Ni,t22 i,t22
DQ DNi,t21 i,t21
]]] ]]Dext 5 g n 2 1 e . (21)S Dit X Q XitQ Ni,t22 i,t22
There is a clear connection between the adjustment rates g and g and theE X
5 Van Praag and Van Ophem (1995) find, for example, that there are almost seven times more
individuals who wish to switch to self-employment than the actual number of switchers.
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parameters l and l of the loss function: 2 g /g 5 l /l . When this ratio3 4 E X 4 3
exceeds 1, the entry rate is more sensitive to a state of disequilibrium than the exit
rate. The disturbance terms e and e are probably positively correlated becauseEit Xit
fluctuations in takeover activity are not incorporated in our model. The correlation
between the disturbance terms gives an indication of the importance of replace-
ment and displacement in an industry within the same period. Displacement and
replacement which take more than one period are accounted for by the adjustment
process. An entry which leads to an increase of the actual number of firms in
excess of the carrying capacity is bound to lead to an exit in a subsequent period
provided the carrying capacity does not grow. An exit reducing the actual number
of firms below the carrying capacity paves the way for an entry in a subsequent
period.
Eqs. (16), (20), (21) should be estimated at the market level or, equivalently, at
the level of a distinct organizational population. The firms which produce and sell
a homogeneous good on the same geographical market are assumed to constitute a
single population effectively isolated from interaction with other populations. Only
6on this level of analysis is the concept of a carrying capacity useful. In our
empirical application we will use aggregated data to estimate the parameters of the
model and then use Eqs. (7) and (9) to estimate the average (equilibrium) number
of firms in the separate markets. A condition for using aggregated data to estimate
parameters at the population (market) level is that the populations do not interact.
In this case, we can change from market to industry index. This is viable for retail
industries because firms which trade on distinct local retail markets usually barely
compete. The parameters of the models when applied to the industry level are then
weighted averages of these same parameters at the market level. We use
aggregated data for two reasons.
First, the number of firms in a market is an integer and will generally be small.
In most periods the net entry rate will be zero and in the periods when it is not, the
difference from zero is necessarily large. This complicates the estimation of the
parameters at a very disaggregated level of analysis. Second, in most applications,
as in ours, only aggregated industry level data are available, for example because
of the lack of clear market boundaries. In manufacturing this implies that several
separate markets each with a limited number of competitors producing an
homogeneous good are compressed into one manufacturing industry usually at best
at the 4-digit level. In distribution this implies that several geographically
separated markets each with a limited number of local competitors are compressed
into one retailing industry usually at best at the regional or state level. In both
6 See Hannan and Carroll (1992) (chapt. 7) for a discussion of the appropriate level of analysis of
organizational populations for the US brewing industry. In their survey of the influence of economics
on sociology, Baron and Hannan (1994) (pp. 1128–1130) pay attention to the similarities between
recent ecological work and research on the evolution of markets.
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cases populations which differ with respect to either the good produced or the
geographical scope are aggregated.
4. Data and characteristics of the retail sector
In this section we start with a short discussion of our data set for Dutch
retailing. Subsequently, some remarks will be made on characteristics of retailing
which are important to keep in mind when applying the model. For the retail sector
we seek to estimate the effect of demand change on the carrying capacity, the
speed of adjustment to an equilibrium situation, and the relative importance of
entry and exit in this adjustment process. We use a panel data set for the Dutch
retail trade. Despite its economic importance retailing has received only limited
attention from industrial economists. The retail sector has a significant contribution
to the economy. It accounted for about 23% of the total number of economically
active enterprises and for about 13% of total labour force in the Dutch private
sector in 1988 (Bode, 1990). These figures are in line with those of other countries
of the European Union (EIM, 1995). The total number of economically active
enterprises in retailing (92 000) in the Netherlands is twice that in manufacturing
(46 700) (EIM, 1991). Retailing is also prominent when we consider the vividity
of entry and exit movements. On average, annual entry and exit rates are almost
10% for the Dutch retail trade (see Table 1). This indicates that sunk entry and exit
costs in Dutch retailing are low.
Our data are available per shoptype (retail industry) in which establishments sell
relatively homogeneous goods. The source of the data on profits is an ongoing
panel of independent, mainly small Dutch retailers. This panel is operated by the
EIM Small Business Research and Consultancy in Zoetermeer. Each year and for
Table 1
Average yearly entry and exit rates in Dutch shoptypes (1981–1988)
Shoptype ent ext Shoptype ent ext
Bicycle stores 0.041 0.052 Pet shops 0.089 0.086
Tobacco shops 0.035 0.070 Household goods 0.087 0.089
Druggists 0.053 0.060 Greengrocers 0.083 0.094
Do-it-yourself shops 0.052 0.066 Supermarkets 0.079 0.098
Bakers 0.060 0.062 Liquor stores 0.085 0.111
Paint, glass, wallpaper 0.049 0.082 Confectioners 0.092 0.107
Dairy shops 0.051 0.081 Furniture stores 0.100 0.105
Shoe stores 0.071 0.073 Fish shops 0.113 0.107
Butchers 0.071 0.079 Furnishing stores 0.109 0.138
Photographers’ shops 0.082 0.079 Textiles mens wear 0.140 0.125
Jewellery 0.080 0.083 Florists 0.154 0.132
Note: The entry and exit rate figures are yearly averages over the 1981–1988 period.
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each shoptype a questionnaire has been sent to a sample of shopkeepers and an
average number of about 70, averaged over the 1981–88 period and the 22
shoptypes in Table 1, have completed and returned it. The source of data on total
consumer demand for product packages sold in the shoptypes is the Central
Bureau of Statistics in Voorburg. The Central Registration Office (CRK) in The
Hague provided data of entry and exit rates of establishments. These data may
suffer from changes in counting procedures which could lead to ‘‘outlying’’
observations. We use the Jarque–Bera statistic to test for normality of the residuals
of the regression equations (Jarque and Bera, 1980). When normality is rejected at
a reasonable level of significance we also estimate the model without the
7‘‘outlying’’ observations. For 22 shoptypes data are available in each of the three
8data sources for the period 1981 through 1988 (176 data points). The correlation
between the entry and exit rates for this panel data set is 0.77. The average entry
and exit rates over the 1981–88 period can be found in Table 1.
Retail markets differ from manufacturing markets. Porter highlighted the most
important elements of the structure of retailing as follows: ‘‘In contrast with
typically low national concentration ratios for a given retail outlet class, the
concentration of retail establishments in the relevant retail market is often high.
Two to five retail establishments commonly make up such a market. The limited
geographic extent of the market and the magnitude of demand within this market
area impose a strong constraint on the maximum number of retailers. The
equivalent constraint on a national manufacturing industry is much weaker, so that
the number of sellers in a retail market is typically smaller than that in even a
‘tight oligopoly’ in manufacturing... . Locational proximity and substantial simi-
larity of product lines promote the structural symmetry of competing retailers.
Local demand trends, important input costs and other key structural market
conditions are likely more similar than among manufacturers. Retail firms can
quickly and accurately detect strategy changes by competitors, and the possibilities
for secret changes are minimal... . A straightforward application of oligopoly
theory suggests, then, that mutual dependence recognized among retail competitors
in a given retail market will be higher than in an equally concentrated manufactur-
7 Wagner (1994) suggested applying both ordinary and reweighted least squares to regression
equations with the entry (or exit) rate as the dependent variable. A weighting procedure is used to limit
the influence of a small number of ‘‘outlying’’ observations on the regression results.
8 Supermarkets constitute one of the 22 shoptypes. This shoptype differs from the other shoptypes in
two respects, both of which are not included in the model. The first difference is the chain effect of
supermarkets. Nationwide chains are important in the supermarket shoptype. The second difference is
the combined assortment effect. Supermarkets typically compete with shops in other shoptypes because
of their broad assortment of goods. The chain effect can be controlled for by leaving out the
supermarket shoptype. The empirical results barely changed as a consequence of this. The combined
assortment effect has caused sales to shift from specialist shops to supermarkets in the Netherlands in
the 1980s but the shares of sales of specialist shops have since stabilized.
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ing industry because detection and retaliation lags are low... . It follows that
competition may lack vigor and the chances for tacit agreement will be high.’’
(Porter, 1976, pp. 13–14).
The oligopoly model presented in Section 2 predicts that the market price level
decreases as the number of independent firms increases (see Eq. (4)). This is due
to the assumption of f to be in excess of 21, at which value the model would
become equivalent to Bertrand competition. From Porter’s remarks we would
certainly expect f to be well above 21 in retailing. Weiss (1989) (chapt. 9)
provides a survey of empirical studies dealing with the relation between price and
market concentration for US food and gasoline retailing. All these studies indicate
9a clear positive effect of market concentration on prices. For example, it is found
for a data set covering 32 US SMSAs in 1974 that supermarket price levels decline
about 15% when going from a monopoly to a completely unconcentrated market.
In the remainder of the paper we will assume Cournot competition (f 5 0),
although the empirical studies for (US) retailing only indicate a f larger than
10
21.
Because of the geographically dispersed demand the shoptypes can be divided
into a large number of local oligopolies usually consisting of only a handful of
establishments selling a relatively homogeneous good. This is a precondition for
the use of the oligopoly model. However, we made two other important
assumptions. First, we assumed a linear cost function. The linearity of the cost
function for retail establishments is theoretically supported by Nooteboom (1982)
and Frenk et al. (1991). See also Dean (1973), Douglas (1973), Nooteboom
(1982) and Thurik (1984) for empirical support. Second, we assumed firms to
have identical cost functions and conjectural variations and as a consequence to
have equal production levels. Porter’s description of the structure of retailing
suggests that retail establishments are indeed confronted with very similar
conditions. The average relative sizes, measured in number of employees, of
entering and exiting firms in Dutch retailing compared to that of incumbents are
11about 0.55 and 0.70, respectively (Klomp and Thurik, 1995). This too provides at
least some support for not discriminating in size between entering, exiting and
incumbent firms.
9 A recent exception, however, is Newmark (1990), who finds that retail grocery prices are not
significantly related to concentration.
10 Aiginger (1996) finds empirical data on Austrian manufacturing firms to be to some extent
compatible with and favourable to the basic Cournot model. Both market share and price elasticity
seem to affect the profit margin of firms in the way predicted by Cournot.
11 Dunne et al. (1988) report that relative sizes of entering and exiting firms in 2-digit US
manufacturing industries are much smaller, between about 0.11 and 0.52.
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5. Two implications of the oligopoly model
In this section we test two implications of the model derived from the
elasticities of profit Eqs. (6) and (7). Therefore, we need an estimate of the cost
function in the various shoptypes. Data of average costs and sales of (three) size
classes (indexed by g) are available for 14 shoptypes from the EIM 1988
questionnaire. The estimation results for the linear cost function for these
12shoptypes in 1988 are similar across shoptypes. The estimates for a range
between 232 442 and 25715 with a mean of 221 738 and the estimates for b
range between 0.903 and 0.942 with a mean of 0.927. In the analysis we use the
estimates when the data of the 14 shoptypes are pooled (t-values between
13parentheses):
2C 5 2 19 553 1 0.924Q , R 5 0.9985, N 5 42. (22)gi gi
(4.4) (165.9)
We proceed as follows. The demand elasticity h and number of firms elasticity hQ N
are estimated for the panel data set. Two implications of the model from Eqs. (6)
and (7), h , 2 2h and h , 1 (because a , 0), are then examined. From theN Q Q
* *discussion below Eq. (9) we know that h 5 (p 1 a) /p in equilibrium. We doQ
*not know the value of p but it should be higher than the modal wage to
compensate for the additional risk and working hours when compared to working
14as an employee. In 1988 the modal wage in the Netherlands was 46 440 guilders.
We therefore expect the demand elasticity of profit in equilibrium to exceed
(46 440 2 19 553) /46 440 5 0.58. However, note that the estimate of a was based
upon data of a subset of 14 shoptypes.
The estimates for the two elasticities, h and h , for the Dutch retail sector areQ N
based upon 22 shoptypes for the 1981–88 period. The effect of the relative change
12 Our definition of costs includes purchase value of products, wages for employees, rent, interest
payments over debt, interest loss over equity, depreciation, transportation, energy, promotion and other
costs. It does not include a reward for the entrepreneur.
13 Note that heteroskedasticity has no important effect on the estimates. This can simply be seen by
comparing the following regression with that given in Eq. (22):
2C /Q 5 0.923 2 19 204(1 /Q ), R 5 0.4837.gi gi gi
(130.0) (6.1)
14 For the 22 shoptypes in our data set the average profit is equal to 69 017 Dutch guilders in 1988.
The average reward for entrepreneurial activity in Dutch retailing is therefore about 50% more than for
the activities of an (modal) employee. This is not unreasonable as starting a retail venture is relatively
simple when compared to starting ventures in most other sectors of the economy. See also Carree and
Thurik (1994).
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in consumer demand for the products primarily sold in the shoptype (DQ /Q )it i,t21
on the relative change in average profit in the shoptype (Dp /p ) is taken as anit i,t21
15estimate for h . Similarly, the estimate for h is equal to the effect of the relativeQ N
change in the number of firms in the shoptype (DN /N ) on the relative changeit i,t21
in average profit. That is, we estimate the ‘‘total differential’’ equation:
Dp DQ DNit it it
]] ]] ]]5 z 1h 1h 1 e . (23)Q N itp Q Ni,t21 i,t21 i,t21
The least squares estimates of h and h can be found in Table 2. From theQ N
Jarque–Bera statistic in the first column of the table it is clear that the residuals are
highly non-normally distributed. This is caused by one outlier (liquor stores, 1981)
with an estimated residual of 11.87, while the second largest estimated residual is
10.64. After removing this observation non-normality can no longer be rejected.
The estimates of h and h are 0.71 and 21.87, respectively. The estimate for hQ N Q
is below unity, while the estimate for h is 22.64 times that of h . We concludeN Q
that reactions of profits on changes in consumer demand and number of firms are
in line with oligopolistic behaviour. From Eq. (7) we estimate Ne to be 22.55, on
average, in Dutch retailing (in the case of Cournot oligopoly: f 5 0). Considering
that the price elasticities of demand in retailing are roughly between 20.4 and
20.9 (Zeelenberg, 1986, p. 116), the average market sizes of the local oligopolies
Table 2
Estimates of the determinants of Dp /p using Eq. (23)Eq. (24)it i,t21
z 0.035 0.029 0.010 20.004
(1.7) (1.7) (0.2) (0.1)
h 0.815 0.708 0.801 0.689Q
(2.2) (2.4) (2.2) (2.3)
h 22.216 21.872N
(2.8) (2.9)
h 22.206 21.859NE
(2.8) (2.9)
h 2.490 2.225NX
(2.5) (2.7)
JB 2334.76 6.21 2372.27 6.60
(0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.037)
2R 0.066 0.071 0.067 0.074
2
x 0.21 0.49h 52hN NE X
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. JB stands for the Jarque–Bera test statistic on normality of the
residuals (P-value in parentheses). In the second and fourth columns one outlier has been removed to
guarantee (near-)normality.
15 Both the consumer demand and the average profit are divided by a general consumer price index to
correct for growth in these variables simply due to inflation.
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in retailing are estimated to be between three and seven firms. This can be
compared with the estimated equilibrium market sizes derived in the next section.
16When the number of firms is equal to the carrying capacity n 5 0.378.Q
We may also consider the effects of entry and exit separately. The results are
presented in the last two columns of Table 2 both with and without the outlying
observation. The equation to be estimated reads:
Dp DQit it
]] ]]5 z 1h 1h ent 1h ext 1 e . (24)Q N it N it itE Xp Qi,t21 i,t21
The variables ent and ext stand for gross entry and exit rates, respectively. Ofit it
course, Eq. (23) is a special case of Eq. (24), where h 5 2h . It appears thatN NE X
an exit has a somewhat larger effect on changes in average profits than an entry.
This may be a consequence of exiting firms to be somewhat larger in size on
average. However, note that the difference of the magnitude of the effects is not
statistically significant. Entry and exit appear to be symmetric in their effect on
changes in the average profit in a shoptype.
6. Empirical results for entry and exit flows in retailing
In this section the empirical results of Eqs. (16), (20), (21) are presented. This
provides us with insight into the effect of demand growth on carrying capacity and
the speed of adjustment in the Dutch retail trade. We study the relative importance
of gross entry and exit in the adjustment process by estimating their sensitivities to
a state of disequilibrium. We will also investigate whether the estimates differ
between shoptypes with generally small shops and shoptypes with somewhat
larger shops on average. The results for the least squares estimation of Eq. (16)
can be found in Table 3.
Only after removing four outlying observations (liquor stores, 1987; furnishing
stores, 1985; confectioners, 1985; photographers’ shops, 1983) could the Jarque–
Bera test on normality not be rejected at the 1% significance level. However,
estimation results barely changed as a result of this. See the first and second
16 The quality of this estimate of n in an equilibrium situation is not much affected by a strongQ
correlation between the estimates of h and h . This correlation is 20.117. Eq. (23) could also beQ N
estimated using fixed shoptype (z ) or time effects (z ), but the hypothesis of equal effects acrossi t
shoptypes or time cannot be rejected. For example, the log-likelihood of the estimation results in the
second column of Table 2 is 31.127. When we add shoptype-dummies the log-likelihood increases to
37.615. The value of the likelihood ratio statistic is therefore equal to 12.98 and is not significant at the
5% significance level (degrees of freedom: 21). When we add time-dummies the log-likelihood
increases to 37.645. The value of the likelihood ratio statistic equals 13.04 and is again not significant
at the 5% significance level (degrees of freedom: 7).
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Table 3
Estimates of the adjustment rate and the demand elasticity using Eq. (16)
g 0.381 0.387 0.391
(6.5) (7.9) (8.0)
g 0.453S
(6.9)
g 0.322L
(5.4)
n 0.301 0.303 0.322Q
(3.5) (4.2) (4.4)
n 0.397QS
(3.8)
n 0.235QL
(2.8)
JB 142.25 2.21 1.86 2.89
(0.000) (0.332) (0.395) (0.235)
2R 0.255 0.324 0.334 0.331
2
x 2.70g 5gS L2
x 1.82n 5nQ QS L
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. JB stands for the Jarque–Bera test statistic on normality of the
residuals (P-value in parentheses). With the exception of the first column four outliers have been
removed to guarantee (near-)normal residuals.
columns of Table 3, respectively. The estimates for g and n are 0.387 and 0.303,Q
respectively. The estimate of the demand elasticity is below the value expected at
equilibrium of 0.378. This implies that the equilibrium size of markets is smaller
*than the actual size of markets in Dutch retailing. Because N e is estimated to be
21.77 using Eq. (9), we expect equilibrium market sizes in retailing to be between
two and five firms (in the case of Cournot oligopoly: f 5 0). In the previous
section we found the actual market sizes to be somewhat larger. This corresponds
to the decrease in the total number of firms in retailing in the period 1981 through
1988 (see also Nooteboom, 1986).
Eq. (16) is estimated assuming that all shoptypes have equally sized
equilibrium market sizes. Some shoptypes may however have smaller equilibrium
market sizes due to higher entry and exit barriers or important scale advantages.
These shoptypes are expected to have a lower adjustment rate and a lower demand
elasticity n . A variable which may effectively distinguish between shoptypes withQ
relatively high and relatively low barriers and scale advantages is average
floorspace in a shoptype. For example, tobacco shops and dairy shops had an
2average floorspace of only 103 and 138 m in 1988. On the other hand, furnishing
stores with mainly furniture and furnishing stores had an average of 3319 and
2 22634 m in that year. The average floorspace in the data set is 558 m with a
standard deviation of 671. In the third and fourth columns of Table 3 we divide
our sample into two equally sized sub-samples: one sample with average
2floorspace smaller than 309 m and one sample with average floorspace larger than
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2309 m . The results show that the speed of adjustment is about 40% higher in
shoptypes with small floorspace. The difference is, however, not statistically
significant. The elasticity of demand may also be estimated separately for the two
groups. The fourth column of the table shows that this elasticity is higher for
shoptypes with little floorspace. The estimate of n in this sample of (very) lowQ
barriers and scale advantages is even larger than the value expected at equilibrium
of 0.378. The difference between the elasticities is, however, again not significant.
We now turn to the relative importance of the entry and exit rate in the
adjustment process. Eqs. (20) and (21) are estimated with Iterative SUR with
demand elasticity n assumed to be equal in the two equations. The estimationQ
results can be found in Table 4. Both the residuals of the gross entry and gross exit
rate equation were non-normally distributed. Only after removing seven outlying
observations (furniture stores, 1988; furnishing stores, 1985; florists, 1982 and
1985; butchers, 1988; and fish shops, 1982 and 1985) could the Jarque–Bera test
on normality not be rejected for both equations at the 1% significance level. From
the second column of Table 4 we find estimates of g , g and n of 0.227, 20.137E X Q
Table 4
Estimates of adjustment rates of gross entry and exit rates using Eq. (20)Eq. (21)
g 0.206 0.227E
(3.7) (5.5)
g 0.332ES
(5.8)
g 0.133EL
(2.6)
g 20.170 20.137X
(3.6) (3.7)
g 20.061XS
(1.2)
g 20.197XL
(3.9)
n 0.314 0.266 0.282Q
(3.6) (3.3) (3.7)
JBE 489.91 2.97 1.24
(0.000) (0.226) (0.538)
JBX 352.38 5.17 1.96
(0.000) (0.075) (0.375)
2R 0.051 0.098 0.135E
2R 0.066 0.070 0.091X
ˆ ˆcorr(e ,e ) 0.540 0.220 0.197E X
2
x 0.17 2.39g 52gE X2 *x 10.53g 52gE XS S2
x 0.75g 52gE XL L
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. With the exception of the first column seven outliers have been
removed to guarantee (near-)normal residuals.
*Significant at the 5% significance level. JBE and JBX stand for the Jarque–Bera test statistics on
normality of the residuals in the entry and exit equations, respectively (P-values in parenltheses).
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and 0.266, respectively. These results show a higher adjustment rate for entry than
for exit, but not significantly so. The correlation between the residuals of Eqs. (20)
and (21) is 0.220 and positive, as expected.
We have also investigated the difference between shoptypes with relatively little
floorspace and much floorspace using the same distinction as in Table 3. Results in
the third column (after removing outlying observations) show that adjustment for a
state of disequilibrium in shoptypes with small floorspace is completely dominated
by changes in the entry rate. A state of disequilibrium seems not to have an effect
on the exit rate. This suggests that when the number of firms is higher than the
carrying capacity a negative net entry rate is caused by a decline in the gross entry
rate rather than by an increase in the gross exit rate. The results for the shoptypes
with the larger shops are quite different. There seems to be no difference in the
ability of the entry or exit rate to generate adjustment in the direction of
equilibrium for these shoptypes.
The relative importance of entry and exit in the adjustment process to a state of
equilibrium can be estimated as follows. Using the estimates 0.227 and 20.137
for g and g we are able to derive an estimate of the ratio l /l of 1.66. TheE X 4 3
penalty on the deviation of the entry rate from the desired level is somewhat
smaller than that of the exit rate. Some evidence for the larger flexibility of the
entry rate can also be found by simply considering the correlation between the net
entry rate, ent 2 ext , and the deviation of the gross entry and exit rates fromit it ] ]their averages over time, ent 2ent and ext 2ext . These correlations are 0.50it i it i
and 20.17, respectively. An increase in the number of firms in a shoptype is
therefore more likely to be accompanied by a relatively high entry rate than by a
relatively low exit rate.
7. Summary and discussion
Entry and exit are reactions to (the lack of) profit opportunities. In this study we
use this simple notion to propose a new and more uniform approach to the study of
entry and exit processes. Following Kirzner, these opportunities may be considered
market ‘‘errors’’. In this study we formalize this line of reasoning by using an error
correction mechanism to explain the extent of entry and exit flows in retailing.
This is done using the notion of carrying capacity. The carrying capacity is that
number of firms at which there is no incentive for net entry (entry minus exit) as
each of the entrepreneurs earns the critical level of profits. It is the (maximum)
number of firms which can be sustained by the market. This is a special case of the
general meaning of carrying capacity in the population ecology literature, which is
the capacity of the environment to support a certain population size. When the
actual number of firms in an industry is below the carrying capacity, an increase in
the net entry rate adjusts for that disequilibrium. This increase may be the result of
an increase in the entry rate or a decrease in the exit rate. The present study
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develops an expression for the carrying capacity. Obviously, changes in consumer
demand are an important determinant of changes in this capacity. This study tests
the theoretical model for Dutch retailing and gives estimates of the effect of
demand change on the carrying capacity, of the speed of adjustment to an
equilibrium situation, and of the relative importance of entry and exit in this
adjustment process. A panel data set of 22 retail industries for the 1981–88 period
is used for this purpose.
Estimation results do not contradict the use of the model at local market levels
which are typical for the retail sector. The demand elasticity of the carrying
capacity in retailing is estimated to be about 0.3. This estimate is comparable to
estimates of the effect of demand growth on net entry found in studies of US
manufacturing (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Hirschey, 1981). The speed of the
adjustment process to a situation where the total number of firms is equal to the
carrying capacity is estimated to be about 40% per year in retailing. This
corresponds to complete adjustment in about 5 years, which is consistent with
empirical evidence found by Levy (1987) for US manufacturing. The role of
change in the entry rate as a means of adjusting to disequilibrium for shoptypes
with mainly small stores was found to be much more important than the role of the
change in the exit rate. MacDonald (1986) also finds for 46 US manufacturing
industries over the period 1976–82 that the effect of growth on the entry rate is
much larger than on the exit rate. The roles of industry profitability and growth
appear to play a more important role, on average, for entry decisions than for exit
decisions. Although Dutch retailing and US manufacturing differ, empirical results
for these two sectors are, by and large, very much in line.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we discuss some alternative adjustment processes which result
from the expected growth in consumer demand depending on the current growth in
consumer demand. The expected growth rate of the carrying capacity is assumed
to be determined by a shoptype-specific element and the growth rate in the current
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period, i.e. E g 5 d 1 d g . Using g 5 n (DQ /Q ) a generalization tot21 it 0i 1 i,t21 it Q it i,t21
Eq. (16) becomes:
DQ DQ DNDN i,t21 i,t22 i,t21it
]] ]]] ]]] ]]D 5 g n (1 1 d ) 2 d 2 1 e . (A.1)S S D DQ 1 1 itN Q Q Ni,t21 i,t22 i,t23 i,t22
We discuss four alternatives for choosing the value of d :1
1. The expected growth in consumer demand does not depend on the current
growth in consumer demand. That is, d 5 0. In this case Eq. (A.1) is identical to1
Eq. (16).
2. The expected growth in consumer demand equals the current growth in
consumer demand. That is, d 5 1.1
3. Entrepreneurs use their previous experience of the relation between the
growth in consumer demand in two consecutive years. The estimation results for
the 22 shoptypes over the 1981–88 period with and without shoptype-specific
constants are as follows (t-values between brackets):
DQDQ i,t21it 2]] ]]]5 d 1 0.346 , R 5 0.250, (A.2)0iQ Qi,t21 i,t22
(4.7)
DQDQ i,t21it 2]] ]]]5 0.006 1 0.425 , R 5 0.193. (A.3)Q Qi,t21 i,t22
(1.7) (6.5)
The hypothesis of equal shoptype-specific constants (d 5 d ) cannot be rejected at0i 0
2the 10% significance level (x (21) 5 12.88). Therefore, we choose d equal to1
0.425.
4. Estimate d directly from Eq. (A.1). The way in which entrepreneurs1
expect consumer demand to change is thus derived from the way in which they
react to this expected change in demand by entering and/or exiting the shoptype.
In Table 5 we show the estimation results for Eq. (A.1) for these four different
alternatives. We use data for the 22 shoptypes over the 1982–88 period (154 data
points). In the lower part of the table we show the results when the four outliers
(liquor stores, 1987; furnishing stores, 1985; confectioners, 1985; photographers’
shops, 1983) are removed from the sample.
From Table 5 we find that a positive value of d may lead to a lower estimated1
adjustment parameter g and a lower estimated demand elasticity n whenQ
compared to the case of d 5 0. The results also show that the variance explained1
is highest for values of d between about 0.25 and 0.5. However, the large standard1
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Table 5
Estimation results using alternative specifications for expected demand growth
Alternative
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
g 0.399 0.370 0.381 0.380
(6.2) (5.7) (6.0) (5.8)
n 0.310 0.188 0.261 0.258Q
(3.3) (3.1) (3.3) (2.5)
d 0 1 0.425 0.4521
(1.0)
2R 0.264 0.268 0.272 0.272
g 0.408 0.380 0.389 0.394
(7.6) (7.0) (7.3) (7.2)
n 0.313 0.180 0.256 0.276Q
(4.1) (3.7) (4.0) (3.3)
d 0 1 0.425 0.2931
(0.9)
2R 0.339 0.334 0.344 0.344
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. In the upper part of the table results for the complete data set
(154 data points) are reported while, in the lower part, results are reported after removing four outlying
observations.
error of the estimated value of d in the case of alternative (iv) indicates that the1
data cannot discriminate between the four alternatives.
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